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Abstract 
 
The focus of this paper is on the four separatist territories that make up the Community 
for Democracy and Rights of Nations and how they derail the western integration efforts of their 
parent states. This piece touches on the major geopolitical players in the former Soviet Union, 
the origin of four frozen conflicts and the bureaucratic complications caused by the separatist 
regions. 
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Introduction 
 
 Relations between Russia and the western world have deteriorated rapidly over the past 
decade. Policy makers have found themselves at odds with the Russian Federation over 
numerous issues – from political developments in the middle east to concerns over human rights 
and civil liberties. Among the many topics that divide Russia and the western world, the eastern 
expansion of NATO and the European Union remains one of the largest. As of today, four 
countries within the former Soviet Union have expressed deep interest in joining both NATO and 
the EU. While different in culture, language and religion they share one common trait: the 
presence of frozen conflicts within their borders. In this piece I will be examining the way that 
frozen conflicts have complicated and delayed the EU and NATO integration procedure for these 
countries and the role that Russia plays in this process. 
           Bloc Politics 
 
When studying political developments in the former Soviet Union it’s critical to 
understand the role of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs are a vehicle for 
cooperation between independent states and can cover a wide variety of policy areas, from 
collective security to economic cooperation. Membership in an IGO also indicates a greater 
alignment to a set of ideas or practices.  
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NATO/EU 
 
The European Union and NATO are important players in the former Soviet Union. The 
EU and NATO cover different policy areas but feature a large overlap in membership. NATO is 
a defensive alliance created during the Cold War. Over the past 20 years, NATO has gradually 
evolved its mission of collective security to include components of peacekeeping and counter 
terror operations. The European Union is the product of decades of cooperation between Western 
European countries. The EU functions as a monetary union, a single economic market and a tool 
for united European foreign policy. Membership in the EU or NATO shows a conformity to 
western values and cooperation with western leadership. As of now, the European Union and 
NATO have expanded to include almost all former members of the Warsaw Pact, three former 
members of the Soviet Union and several Yugoslav republics.  
EEU 
 
The Eurasian Economic Union is an organization similar to the European Union. Like the 
European Union, the EEU seeks to form a single market among its members and coordinate both 
economic activity and foreign policy. Where the EEU and EU differ is in their leadership and the 
dynamic between their members. The EEU is composed of four countries - Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia. When looking at these four countries we can see Russia’s absolute 
advantage over the other members. Russia is not only the largest in terms of size and population 
but also in economic and military might. In comparison, power is much more evenly distributed 
throughout European Union -while Germany may lead the group in economic strength, France 
and the United Kingdom have a larger foreign policy influence.  
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GUAM 
 
Officially known as the “GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic 
Development”, GUAM is a regional IGO of states aspiring for EU and NATO membership. The 
name is an acronym of its members - Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. GUAM’s 
function is similar to the Visegrad 4 and Baltic Council - to promote regional cooperation during 
western integration. An example of GUAM cooperation would be the establishment of the 
Transcaspian trade route. All members of GUAM are pursuing EU-associate status. EU 
association is not full membership (nor is it a guarantee of future membership) but rather an 
elevated diplomatic status. EU associates are considered a component of the EU’s united foreign 
policy and are compatible with the EU customs standards and industry regulations.  
  
CDRN 
 
The CDRN is one of the lesser known IGOs in the former Soviet Union. It’s membership 
is made up of unrecognized breakaway states locked in frozen conflicts. Conflicts are deemed 
frozen when there is no discernible end in sight yet the intensity of combat has significantly 
decreased. Because the CDRN’s members are not recognized by the United Nations and have no 
formal diplomatic ties to any country the organization acts as the only avenue of international 
cooperation. Examples of cooperation between CDRN members includes the establishment of a 
visa regime for CDRN citizens and joint declarations of mutual defense in case of attack. It’s 
worth noting that all members of the CDRN are locked in frozen conflicts against GUAM 
members. 
Conflicts in Context 
 
The frozen conflicts that created the breakaway states of CDRN began during the 
turbulent years during the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main players in these frozen 
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conflicts are the newly created post-Soviet states, the ethnic minorities within them and the 
Russian Federation. 
 
Abkhazia 
 
Abkhazia is located in the northwest part of Georgia. It is flush with the Russian 
Federation’s border and is on the eastern half of the Black Sea. Abkhazia is the home of the 
Abkhaz people and spent much of its time in the Soviet Union as an autonomous oblast. The first 
conflict between the Georgians and the Abkhazians began between 1992 and 1993. After years 
of tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians, Abkhaz separatists declared themselves 
independent and began organizing themselves for armed rebellion with the intent of creating an 
independent Abkhaz state. Georgia responded with a counter-attack and planned to retake the 
territory. Georgia struggled to regain the separatist lands and eventually called upon the OSCE 
and international community to mediate some sort of ceasefire. While officially neutral in the 
conflict, Human Rights Watch has found significant evidence that shows unofficial Russian 
support for Abkhaz separatists in the form of weapons and Russian irregular volunteers (HRW). 
As of now, Abkhazia is considered an autonomous region of Georgia with its own functioning 
government in Sukhumi.   
 
South Ossetia 
 
South Ossetia is located in the northernmost part of central Georgia. It is inhabited by 
native Ossetians and Russians. The territory known as “North Ossetia” is located in the Russian 
Federation. South Ossetia was considered an autonomous Oblast during the Soviet Union but 
was administered by the Georgian SSR. In 1990, South Ossetia declared it’s independence from 
Georgia. Georgia refused to recognize any sort of independence from the region and considered 
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such a declaration to be an infringement of its sovereignty. While the USSR (and later Russian 
Federation) proclaimed neutrality during the conflict, some Georgian reports show overt signs of 
Russian intervention in support of the Ossetian separatists. Eventually, a ceasefire was brokered 
between the Georgians and South Ossetians with a status of semi-autonomy granted to the 
contested territory. Part of this deal included the creation and deployment of a multinational 
peacekeeping brigade in South Ossetia. During the 2008 surge of fighting between the Georgian 
military and Ossetian fighters, the Russian Federation intervened in support of the Ossetians and 
launched a counterattack against Georgia. 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
 
Unlike the other breakaway states of the CDRN, Nagorno-Karabakh does not border 
Russia nor does it contain a significant amount of Russian speakers. Nagorno-Karabakh was an 
autonomous oblast located within Azerbaijan with an Armenian majority. It’s separated from 
Armenia by a thin strip of Azeri territory. While autonomous the area was considered a part of 
Azerbaijan. During the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself 
independent from Azerbaijan and voiced its intent to integrate into Armenia-proper. Azerbaijan 
refused to recognize this declaration. After months of mounting tensions, the Armenian military 
launched an offensive to connect Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The following war between 
Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijan nearly escalated into an interstate conflict. 
Eventually, the OSCE brokered a tense ceasefire and a peacekeeping mission was established. 
While low-level skirmishes continue along the border with Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh 
enjoys limited autonomy and good relations with Armenia. 
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Transnistria 
 
 Transnistria is a small strip of land located in Moldova’s eastern half. The area runs 
vertically along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and has a population of approximately 500,000 
people. Transnistria was part of a larger Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
within the Soviet Union. This autonomous entity covered what is today Transnistria and parts of 
Moldova and Ukraine. During the collapse of the Soviet Union, many ethnic Russians within 
Moldova were concerned about the future of Russian language and identity in the newly formed 
republic. Russians living in Moldova felt threatened by the formal establishment of Romanian as 
the national language. After months of increasing tensions between Moldovan and Russians 
living in Moldova, the residents of Transnistria declared themselves the “Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic” (“PMR”) and established Tiraspol as their capital. Initially 
there was little response from the Moldovan government. It wasn’t until Moldovan authorities 
began clearing barricades and roadblocks set by the PMR that small-scale conflict between 
separatists and Moldovans. The conflict was mostly limited to skirmishes and minor clashes with 
police. While the official stance of the USSR was neutrality towards the conflict, extensive 
evidence and personal accounts attribute the 14th Soviet Guards Army to collaborating with the 
Transnistrian separatists. The 14th army was stationed near Odessa and provided material 
support and training to the separatists in addition to engaging Moldovan forces in combat. As of 
today, Transnistria remains in a state of limited sovereignty and contains a joint Ukrainian-
Russian-Transnistrian peacekeeping force.  
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Methods of Disruption 
 
Border Uncertainties 
As a result of these separatist conflicts, Georgia and Moldova have had significant 
trouble in securing the integrity of their borders. This is a particular problem in areas along the 
Russian Federation. These separatists states have become conduits for human trafficking, arms 
smuggling and other black market trades (E.P 2006). This is due to the inability of proper 
authorities to enforce the law (C.E.U 2000). Many EU members have voiced concern that the 
inability for Moldova and Georgia to limit black market activity within their borders shows that 
they are unfit for EU associated status (E.C 2014). To further complicate things, recent events 
have shown that the borders of these areas are fluid. Separatists have gradually moved the 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian borders further and further southward since the ceasefire 
(Elleson). This past summer, sections of a BP pipeline in Georgia fell under control of separatist 
forces.   
Separatist Citizenship and Passports 
  
 Many GUAM members are in the process of negotiating a visa-liberalization plan with 
the European Union. This would minimize the need for visas and document checks when 
traveling to and from the EU. Such an agreement would also open the possibility of visa-free 
travel throughout the European Union. Unfortunately, the existence of separatist and semi-
autonomous states has complicated this process. This is due to the unclear citizenship status of 
people living in separatist areas and an ongoing debate whether or not the visa regime would 
apply to them. There are three types of passports held by CDRN residents: 
1: Soviet Passports 
It’s very common for elderly residents of separatist areas to hold documents issued by the 
Soviet Union. In many cases it is unclear which country their citizenship would be transferred to. 
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If man living in Abkhazia holds a Soviet passport with “Georgian” marked as his nationality, 
who holds liability over him? It is worth noting that almost all Soviet passports are currency 
considered invalid. 
 
2: Separatist Passports 
All four members of the CDRN have issued their own form of passport. They are almost 
entirely invalid for international travel (Civil.ge). This is due to both the unrecognized status of 
the countries issuing the passports and the lack of counterfeiting prevention in the document. The 
main use for separatist passports is for travel within the CDRN. Many holders of separatist 
issued passports are considered stateless persons (Hewitt). 
 
3: Foreign passports 
It's very common for CDRN residents to hold passports issued by foreign countries. The 
most common foreign passport among CDRN residents is a Russian passport. Passports issued 
by GUAM members are also used by those living in separatist regions. The exception to this is 
Nagorno-Karabakh, where Armenian passports are the norm.  
  
 
Russian Media and influence 
 
 While Russia pledged neutrality during the separatist conflicts its support for the CDRN's 
break-away governments is undeniable. Russian influence is visible at many levels. The lowest 
level is in the day to day interactions of CDRN residents. Russian language is the mother tongue 
of a  majority of CDRN citizens. While this makes sense in a location like Transnistria, this trend 
is even visible in areas like South Ossetia where majority of the residents identify as “Ossetian”. 
Russian language is also used in schools and governments across the CDRN (including the 
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CDRN Secretariat's website). The most accessible and available form of media in the CDRN 
comes from Russian sources like RT, Sputnik and TASS.  
 When we look towards the functions of governments within the CDRN, Russia's 
influence persists. Many politicians in the CDRN, such as former President Smirnov of 
Transnistria, have extensive ties to Russia's political system (Oleksy). This includes the financial 
operations of breakaway states. The Russian Federation's monetary support for the members of 
the CDRN ranges from financial assistance and loans to the subsidization of pension programs 
and social services (Puiu). 
 The most visceral display of Russia's influence over CDRN members is its military 
presence. While officially part of peacekeeping operations, Russia has used its peacekeeping 
brigades for its own gain. We've seen the mobilization of peacekeeping forces as a sort of 
deterrent towards Russia's neighbors. During the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, most of the 
Russian offensive was conducted by military units stationed in breakaway territories (Deibert). 
Over the past two years, Russia has issued mobilization and readiness drills to its forces stationed 
in Transnistria in response to the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict (Day). The usage of 
peacekeeping brigades in national defense policy questions the true motives of Russia's military 
presence in the CDRN. 
The Future 
 
The future of the CDRN is uncertain. There have not been any serious efforts to push for 
international recognition of separatist independence nor is there a strategy to reintegrate 
breakaway states. A recent surge in fighting between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan has 
raised questions about the long term sustainability of these frozen conflicts. Many predict that as 
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine gradually winds down that a semi-autonomous region may form 
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in Donetsk and Luhansk. While it's difficult to say what the future holds for these pseudo states, 
it will be impossible for Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova to integrate into the EU or NATO as 
long as the current frozen conflicts continue. 
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